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12
the Court, in affirming, might very well
expand on its decision in Torcaso, and
might outlaw religious tests not only for
public officials but also for jurors and
witnesses. Such a decision, establishing a
national standard, would prevent state decisions from remaining as controlling
authority.

Claim of Relational Right of
Privacy Denied
The widow and son of Alphonse (Al)
Capone and the administratrix of his
estate brought an action against the producers, the sponsor and the broadcasting
company which telecast several programs
purportedly based on the life of the deceased. The estate claimed a property
right in the name, likeness and personality
of Capone, while the wife and son asserted
an invasion of their right of privacy, even
though they were not mentioned in the
telecast. In affirming the decision of the
district court, the United States Court of
Appeals held that the estate had no protectible property right in the name, and,
that under Illinois law, living relatives of
a decedent are not entitled to recover
under a "relational right" of privacy.
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d
418 (7th Cir. 1965).
Although the right of privacy is now
recognized and protected,' it has been held

1 See

generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right

of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); The
Right of Privacy, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 335 (1965).
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The fact that the Maryland provision
remained in effect for so long is indicative
of how religious beliefs are used to judge
a man's qualifications for public service.
The courts should be quick to assert that
religion is not an acceptable standard by
which the state should judge a man's
capacity.

2
that a deceased person has no such right.
However, there is some conflict 3 as to
whether there exists a "relational right"
of privacy, i.e., a right of the living relatives of the decedent to be protected from
unwarranted publications or disclosures
concerning the deceased person's life. The
prevailing opinion is that the right of
privacy is personal, not relational, and
4
that it does not survive the decedent.
This conclusion follows from the failure
of the courts to recognize a right of privacy
when the party claiming the right is not
mentioned in the course of the alleged
invasion, 5 and from the historical policy
against survival of defamation actions.6

300 F.2d 854, 857 (7th
Cir. 1962); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434,
447, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (1895).
Compare Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep.
2d 315, 322-23, 239 P.2d 876, 881 (1952),
with Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So.
2d 118, 121 (1948).
4 E.g., Coversone v. Davies, 38 Cal. Rep. 2d
315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952); Bradley v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168
N.E.2d 64 (1960).
5Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., supra
note 4.
6 See Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L.
REV. 237, 247-48 (1932).
2 Ravellette v. Smith,
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Most of the early "relational rights"
cases, wherein the courts denied recovery
for invasion of privacy, were brought
primarily on the theory of injury to feelings. Thus, in Schuyler v. Curtis,' relatives of a deceased woman sought to enjoin the erection of a statue of the deceased by which the defendants intended
to honor her as a philanthropist. The
court decided that erection of such a
statue provided no plausible grounds to
the relatives for injured feelings, and thus,
the facts were not sufficient to constitute
an invasion of their privacy. However,
the court did not deny that there could
be a "relational right" if the proper
grounds existed. "[O]ur decision furnishes
. . . not the slightest occasion for the
belief that under it the feelings of relatives or friends may be outraged or the
memory of a deceased person degraded
with impunity, by any person ... "I'
Where, in addition to injured feelings,
there was evidence of commercial exploitation, some courts have recognized
the possibility of recovery. Thus, where
a hospital permitted a newspaper to take
unauthorized photographs of a deformed
infant's corpse, it was held that the parents had a valid cause of action.9 Likewise,
where a photographer was employed to
take a dozen photographs of the corpses
of Siamese twins, and where additional
147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895).
8 Id. at 452, 42 N.E. at 27.

9 Bazemore

v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257,
155 S.E. 194 (1930). Although this case constitutes only slight authority for recognition of
a "relational right" of privacy, since it involved
violation of a confidential relationship, it nonetheless recognizes that there can be an invasion
of privacy when the wrongful act is directed
at a deceased person.

copies were made and copyrighted, an
action by the parents for invasion of their
right of privacy and breach of a confidential relationship was sustained.1" Although
in both of these cases the courts relied
on the relational interest that parents have
in their children, their arguments were
reinforced by the evidence that confidential relationships had been violated. Thus,
in circumstances where there existed both
commercial exploitation and the violation
of surviving relatives' rights, the courts
were willing to grant recovery.
An examination of statutory development in this area discloses that only four
states presently protect the right of privacy, and then, only when there has been
Of the four
commercial exploitation."
states, only New York restricts its protection to living persons. 12 The remaining
three states afford some protection to the
next of kin ("relational right") where
there has been an appropriation of the
13
decedent's name. In a Utah decision,
the widow and daughter of an entertainer
sought to enjoin the exhibition of a motion
picture which fictionalized incidents in his
life. The court held that the statute was
applicable only where the violation constituted actual advertising or the promotion of a collateral commodity (a product
using the name of the decedent), and did
not extend to a semi-fictional portrayal
of a person's life in a motion picture. In
1ODouglas

v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W.

849 (1912).
OKLA.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839 (1958); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-4-8 (1953), § 76-4-9 (Supp. 1963);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50.
12

''N.Y.

13 Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib.
Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954).

12
balancing the rights of the individual
against public policy, the court noted:
Where the right of privacy of the individual is pitted against the general weal,
we give some consideration to the precept
that the best social policy is that which
results in the greatest good to the greatest
number, unless application of this principle
cuts into inviolable rights of the individual.

14

Thus, in adopting a utilitarian approach,
the court construed the statute very narrowly, giving motion picture makers wide
latitude in fictionalizing biographies of
deceased persons.
The defenses traditionally applicable to
a right of privacy action can also be
asserted in an action based on a "relational right." Where an event is newsworthy, the mass media are privileged to
report it under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. 15 Also,
when a person becomes a public figure,
he relinquishes a part of his right of
privacy, as the public has a justifiable
16
interest in the notorious events of life.
For example, in Metter v. Los Angeles
Examiner,17 a widower sued a newspaper
which published a story and picture of
his wife's suicide leap from a building.
He based his action on the theory of an
invasion of his "relational right" of privacy. The court denied recovery because
the wife's suicide was a newsworthy matter

14

Id. at 264, 272 P.2d at 183.

'1

See, e.g., Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496,

83 So. 2d 235 (1955); Waters v. Fleetwood,
212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
16 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1941); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37
So. 2d 118 (1948).
17 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
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which made her a public figure, and, thus,
not the subject of a right of privacy.
In the instant case, the appellate tribunal affirmed the lower court's rejection of the plaintiff's claim of injury to a
property right, and agreed that the extent
of the relief sought was for an alleged
invasion of a right of privacy. In doing
so, it dismissed the plaintiff's analogy to
the "dead body cases," wherein courts
have granted relief for an invasion of the
right to bury the remains of a deceased
relative.
After stating that, under Illinois decisional law, the right of privacy was personal, and that in order to prevail the
plaintiff must prove invasion of his own
right of privacy, the Court observed that
"it is anomalous to speak of the privacy
of a deceased person. . . . Comment,
fictionalization and even distortion of a
dead man's career do not invade the
privacy of his offspring. .. ."Is However,
it should be noted that the concurring
opinion disagreed on this latter point, and
expressed the conviction that the right of
privacy of the deceased's widow and son
had indeed been invaded. Moreover, the
concurring judge stated his belief that the
lives of the widow and son were shattered
after the television series began. He noted
that the son's children were ridiculed so
incessantly that their father found it necessary to remove them from school, to sell
his home and restaurant business, to
change his name and to move to another
city. Nonetheless, while expressing his
abhorrence of the fictionalization of
Capone's career, the concurring judge
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d
418, 420 (7th Cir. 1965).

's
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agreed with the majority that, under Illinois law, there was no available remedy.
The lower court had also found that a
wrong had been committed, and that a
remedy should have been available for
these plaintiffs, although one was lacking
under present law.19
The instant case indicates the harshness
of the present status of the law in the
area of the right of privacy, under which
relief cannot be granted for the invasion
of a "relational right" of privacy. The
traditional restrictions endure: unless a
plaintiff can prove that he was specifically
mentioned or portrayed, he will remain
without a remedy when only his relative's
name is appropriated.
While there is some conflicting opinion
in the area, most authorities are in accord
that a "relational right" of privacy should
be recognized by the courts. 20 One argument is that since the interest one has in
his relationship with a deceased member
of the family has received protection
against physical appropriation, there is no
reason why such protection should not
be given to intangible appropriation, especially where it is of the commercial type.
The law has progressed from protection
of the physical person to protection of
reputation and sensibilities. It is no greater
transition from protection of a dead body
to protection of the reputation and memory of a departed relative. Nor are the
Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 230 F. Supp.
721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
1.

20See Gordon, Right of Property in Name,
Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U.
L. REV. 553, 594-605 (1960); Green, Relational
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 485-90 (1934);
Nizer, The Right of Privacy-A Half Century's
Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 553-56
(1941).

sensibilities of the living concerning their
departed kin to be ignored. Judicial recognition of the fact that one's own privacy may be invaded by unauthorized use
of the name or picture of a deceased
member of his family is a step forward in
the historical
2

tradition of the common

law. '
The "relational right" of privacy may
also be analogized to "defamation by association." A publication may defame a
person even though, on its face, it makes
no direct reference to him. The reference
may be indirect, with the identification
depending upon circumstances known to
the hearers. It is not necessary that every
listener understand the significance of the
utterance, so long as there are some who
reasonably understand its defamatory
22
meaning.
To some extent, at least, this theory
appears applicable to the circumstances
of the instant case. While there may have
been no specific reference to the individuals alleging an invasion of their privacy, there was, nonetheless, an unfortunate association in the minds of friends and
neighbors between them and the personality which was appropriated and fictitiously portrayed. Consequently, it might
be argued that the invasion of Al Capone's
privacy and the damages suffered by his
relatives are facts sufficient to state a
cause of action-an "invasion by association."
The case against the recognition of such
a "relational right" hinges on the contention that it would open the floodgates to
litigation. Since special damages need not
be shown in invasion of privacy cases,
21

22

Nizer, supra note 20, at 556.
See GREGORY & KALVEN, TORTS

(1959).

968-73

12
every relative, no matter how distant,
might claim that his rights had been invaded. 3 However, it should not be overlooked that the courts are daily confronted
with similar problems in those libel cases
where special damages need not be
alleged; and certainly in the libel area this
problem has never been regarded as a
serious obstacle to recovery.
Since most courts have thus far refused
to break precedent and recognize a "relational right" of privacy, legislative action
is required. If Oklahoma and Virginia,
whose statutes are similar to that of Utah,
should adopt the same narrow construction of "commercial exploitation" accepted
in that jurisdiction, then it will be apparent that this type of statutory protection
is not completely effective. A well drafted
statute should protect against any invasion
of a deceased person's memory, and
should extend beyond protection from
mere promotion of collateral commodities
which capitalizes on the name or personality of a decedent. It should, in fact,
proscribe all commercial exploitation of
the decedent's name, personality and likeness whenever the publication is primarily
fictional or for entertainment and amuse"Every defamation, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution would then be an actionable invasion of the privacy of the relatives
of the victim." Coverstone v. Davies, supra
note 3.
23
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ment, as distinguished from a publication
primarily historical, and, thus, intended
for the education or information of the
24
public.
In failing to overcome the inertia of the
law, this decision has highlighted the injury to relatives that can result from unrestricted commercial exploitation of a
deceased person's name and personality.
It is apparent that in this age of modern
news media, the typical invasion of privacy by network telecasting will involve
most of the fifty states. Consequently,
either a federal or a uniform state statute
is required to provide the necessary protection. In view of the likelihood of increased judicial and legislative acceptance
of the right of privacy, and because of the
growing need for controlling the exploitive
tendencies of radio and television, such
legislation may well be forthcoming.
A uniform right of privacy act has been
proposed in Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48
Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 734, 764 (1948): "Any person, firm
or corporation that interferes with any living
person, or with a deceased's memory, by intruding, in any unreasonable and serious manner upon the private activities of the living,
or by making known in like manner the private
affairs of any one, living or deceased, or by
exposing such person to the public by substantial use of his name, portrait, picture, likeness
or by other means sufficient to identify him,
shall be liable for invasion of his privacy ..
(Emphasis added.)
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